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I. INTRODUCTION
Until the passage of the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1984,
federal judges had relatively wide discretion in sentencing federal offenders up to the statutory maximum.1 This judicial discretion led to a disparity
* J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center (2009); U.S. Marine Corps Officer (2001–2005);
B.S., English, Northeastern University (2000).
1. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993) (describing the evolution of federal criminal sentencing and parole prior to 1984); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION,
AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.
SENTENCING COMM‘N], available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf (―Before
guidelines were developed, judges could give a defendant a sentence that ranged anywhere from probation to the maximum penalty for the offense.‖). According to a report by the Sentencing Commission,
prior to implementation of the SRA, federal crimes carried very broad ranges of penalties; federal
judges had the discretion to choose the sentence they felt would be most appropriate. U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN
YEAR REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15year.htm. Judges were not required to
explain their reasons for the sentence imposed, and the sentences were largely immune from appeal.
Id. The time actually served by most offenders was determined by the Parole Commission, and offenders, on average, served just 58 percent of the sentences that had been imposed. Id. The sentencing
process, a critical element of the criminal justice process, was opaque, undocumented, and largely
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in the sentences of similarly situated offenders, particularly in white-collar
cases.2 The Guidelines attempted to eliminate this disparity by establishing
maximum and minimum sentences for certain offenses based on the characteristics of the crime.3 An important feature of the Guidelines system
was its mandatory nature, which decreased and structured the judiciary‘s
discretion within bounds set by Congress.4
The mandatory application of the Guidelines resulted in stiff sentences
for white-collar criminals, effectively reducing the disparity in sentencing
that had existed prior to implementation.5 However, in January of 2005,
the U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker6 that the Guidelines‘ mandatory use of enhancing factors not found by a jury was unconstitutional, and the proper remedy for this constitutional error was to sever
the provisions from the statute that made the Guidelines mandatory, rendering the Guidelines advisory.7 Then, in December of 2007, the Court
effectively eliminated the mandatory guideline sentencing entirely in Gall
v. United States.8
Although the Gall decision impacts all sentencing within the federal
court system, a significant group of criminal defendants that one should
expect to be impacted are high-ranking corporate officers convicted of
financial crimes. Theoretically, those defendants should now expect to
receive lighter sentences, in part because of the subjective factors available
to district court judges during sentencing which were expressly rejected by
appellate courts prior to Gall.9
Additionally, because judges often articulate the view that white-collar
crime lacks violence and identifiable victims10—a belief that tends to obscure the severity of the harm caused by white-collar crimes11—their personal views often influence white-collar defendants‘ sentences. Although
discretionary. Because of its impenetrability to outside observers, there was a sense that the process
was unfair, disparate, and ineffective for controlling crime. Id.
2. See FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 55–56.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (2006) (―The Commission . . . shall, for each category of offense involving each category of defendant, establish a sentencing range . . . .‖).
4. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 293 n.12 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
Congress had rejected an advisory guidelines scheme when formulating the Guidelines).
5. See Exhibit 1 infra.
6. 543 U.S. 220.
7. Id. at 258–61.
8. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
9. See generally Claude M. Tusk, Sentencing Post-Gall: Reasonableness v. Proportionality, 238
N.Y. L.J. 4 (2007).
10. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINALS 64 (1988) (stating that judges‘ comments ―[o]nly rarely . . . indicate any possible similarity
between white-collar crimes and violent crimes‖).
11. Matthew A. Ford, Comment, White-Collar Crime, Social Harm, and Punishment: A Critique
and Modification of the Sixth Circuit’s Ruling in United States v. Davis, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 383,
395 (2008).
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one of the motivating factors behind Congress‘s passage of the Guidelines
was the relatively light sentences given to white-collar criminals,12 recent
trends demonstrate that judges have increasingly imposed more lenient
sentences upon white-collar defendants since the Booker decision, a trend
which Gall could help accelerate.13
This note will theoretically analyze why one should expect lighter sentences for defendants convicted of financial crimes, and it will test that
theory by examining sentences imposed on Chief Financial Officers
(CFOs) from 1998 to 2007.
II. EXPLAINING THE DOWNWARD DEPARTURE TREND: THE IMPACT OF
BOOKER AND GALL ON THE GUIDELINES
A. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Overview
The Guidelines, promulgated under the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (SRA),14 were created under the authority of Congress with three
goals in mind: (1) to create a more honest system in which defendants
served more of their given sentences,15 (2) to establish a uniform sentencing scheme that limited disparity across federal jurisdictions, and (3) to
enact a proportional system that ―impose[d] appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of different severity.‖16 The SRA attempted to
accomplish its goals by eliminating parole and forming a Sentencing
Commission whose task it would be to create a set of guidelines designed
to limit sentencing disparities throughout the country.17 The Commission‘s
specific job was to ―rationalize the sentencing rules, to bring to bear the
latest scientific studies in effectuating all of the purposes of punishment,

12. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 22 (1988).
13. Adam Liptak, Given the Latitude to Show Leniency, Judges May Not, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2007, at A28. Recent statistics show that 12 percent of sentences today are below the Guideline range,
an increase from 5.5 percent in 2004. Id. Interestingly, sentences below the Guideline range have been
given in 11.9 percent of today‘s cases, while only 1.6 percent of sentences have been above Guideline
range. Linda Greenhouse, Court Restores Sentencing Powers of Federal Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2007, at A1.
14. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
15. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(A)(3) (2007) (stating that proponents of
sentencing reform complained that in many cases ―good time‖ credits and parole dramatically reduced
defendants‘ sentences to, in some cases, one-third of the actual sentence handed down by the district
court).
16. Id.
17. Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U.
L. REV. 693, 701–02 (2005).
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and to do the kind of leg work in determining the appropriate sentencing
practices that Congress had been unable or unwilling to do.‖18
Congress instructed the Commission to establish maximum and minimum sentences for certain offenses based on the characteristics of the
crime.19 Each crime was to have a particular value of severity that would
be reflected in a defendant‘s sentence.20 Among the principal targets for
more serious penalties under the new Guidelines system were white-collar
and violent repeat offenders.21 Because the Guidelines were mandatory,
they did not reflect a specific sentencing philosophy, but attempted to codify empirical data about how crimes were sentenced in the past into a system that produced consistent and predictable results that could be adjusted
as the need arose.22 Although many judges opposed implementation of the
Guidelines and saw them as a power grab by the legislative branch,23 there
was little they could do to stop their passage.24
The mandatory Guidelines resulted in stiff sentencing for white-collar
criminals. As shown in Exhibit 1,25 the sentencing of white-collar criminals during this period demonstrates the effectiveness of mandatory guidelines, ensuring that defendants were given sentences reflecting the nature
of their crimes as designated by Congress, not sentences based upon subjective factors determined by judges.

18. Nancy Gertner, Speech, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV.
569, 573–74 (2005).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (―The Commission . . . shall, for each category of offense involving each
category of defendant, establish a sentencing range . . . .‖).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m). The statute also instructs the Commission to ―insure that the guidelines
reflect the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the
offense.‖ Id.
21. U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, supra note 1, at 2.
22. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(A)(3) (2007) (―For now, the Commission
has sought to solve both the practical and philosophical problems of developing a coherent sentencing
system by taking an empirical approach that uses data estimating the existing sentencing system as a
starting point.‖).
23. ―A 1992 poll found more than half of all federal judges believed that the federal guideline system should be completely eliminated, while a 1997 survey concluded that more than two-thirds of
federal judges viewed the guidelines as unnecessary.‖ Carol P. Getty, Panel Session Paper, Twenty
Years of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 7 J. INST. JUST. INT‘L STUD. 117, 119 (2007).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 994.
25. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 57–58.
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Exhibit 1
Rate of Imprisonment for Individual Crimes
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B. Booker and Its Aftermath
The Booker decision required district courts to consider the guideline
range established in the same fashion as before, but the courts could now
―tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well . . . .‖26 The
judge must consider the Guidelines27 and other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), but is not required to impose a sentence specified by the Guidelines.28 Although ―[j]udicial fact-finding is permitted as long as it is understood that the guidelines are not mandatory,‖29 a judge is required to
26. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
27. The two main components of the federal guidelines were the seriousness of the offense and the
defendant‘s criminal history. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2006). In applying the
guidelines in each case, the sentencing court first determined the appropriate base level for the offense
of conviction under Chapter Two (Offense Conduct). Id. § 1B1.1(a). The court then made any adjustments to that level as warranted by factors detailed in Chapters Two and Three (Adjustments). Id. §§
1B1.1(b)–(c). Next, the court determined the defendant‘s criminal history category under Chapter Four
(Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood). Id. § 1B1.1(f). Based on the total calculated offense level
after adjustments and the criminal history category, the court determined the corresponding guideline
range on the guideline range chart listed in Part A in Chapter Five. Id. § 1B1.1(g). If, after determining the applicable guideline range, the court believed that range did not adequately reflect the proper
punishment for the specific defendant, the court could depart upward or downward from the guideline
range only for reasons listed in Chapter Five, Section K. Id. §§ 1B1.1(h)–(i), 5G1.1(c).
28. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
29. United States v. Mooney, 401 F.3d 940, 949 (8th Cir. 2005).
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state ―in open court‖ the reason for a particular sentence, and, if the sentence is outside of the Guidelines, the court must provide a specific reason
for the different sentence.30 Also, on appellate review, Booker directed the
courts to evaluate a sentence under a ―reasonableness‖ standard.31
Although Booker rendered the Guidelines merely advisory, one change
of note was the emergence of the non-guideline sentence in which a district
court finds that no Chapter Five departures apply to the defendant,32 but
instead the court relies exclusively on the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553
in sentencing the defendant.33 To determine the non-guideline sentence,
the court must consider the advisory guideline range in making its determination, but if it finds a compelling reason under Section 3553 to impose
a sentence above or below the Guidelines, it may now do so.34
According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission‘s Special Post-Booker
Coding Project,35 as of February 22, 2006, 10.8 percent of post-Booker
white-collar cases have involved sentences ―otherwise below the range,‖
meaning that a district court granted either a Booker departure, or some
other non-government sponsored or guideline-authorized downward departure from the guideline range.36 This is the second highest percentage of
downward-departures of any guideline—only the downward departure for

30. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2003).
31. Booker, 543 U.S. at 263.
32. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(h), 5G1.1(c). Chapter Five, Section K provides the valid bases under which a district court may depart (upward or downward) from the guideline
range. The most frequently used departure is the substantial assistance motion listed under section
5K1.1—allowing the district court, upon motion by the government, to depart from the guidelines
based on a defendant‘s ―substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense‖; but section 5K also provides for several other departures, including a
downward departure for a victim‘s conduct in provoking the behavior (section 5K2.10), and an upward
departure for damage or loss not taken into account by relevant conduct (section 5K2.5). Id. §§ 5K1.1,
5K2.5, 5K2.10.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This section instructs sentencing judges, in crafting a defendant‘s sentence, to consider, among other things:
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes from the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational and vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
Id.
34. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264–65.
35. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
ON FEDERAL SENTENCING app. D-5 (2006) [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/booker_report/Booker_Report.pdf.
36. Id.; see also Exhibit 2 infra.
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firearms was higher.37 Moreover, as shown in Exhibit 3,38 the average deviation from the white-collar guidelines, at just over 93 percent, was much
higher than the average deviation from other guidelines.39
Exhibit 2
Departure Rate Below Guideline Post-Booker
(2005-2006)
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37. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 35, at app. D-5. 9.7 percent of defendants sentenced under section
2D1.1 (drug trafficking) have received downward variances, and 11.1 percent of defendants sentenced
under section 2K2.1 (firearms) have received downward variances. See Exhibit 2 infra.
38. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 35, at app. D-24.
39. Id.; see also Exhibit 3 infra. Ironically, one of the motivating factors behind Congress‘s institution of the Guidelines was the lighter sentencing of white-collar defendants. See Breyer, supra note 12,
at 22 (stating that the Sentencing Commission ―considered present sentencing practices, where whitecollar criminals receive probation more often than other offenders who committed crimes of comparable severity, to be unfair‖). Also, in response to a wave of corruption marked by the collapse of Enron
and an accounting scandal at WorldCom, President Bush created the Corporate Fraud Task Force. See
Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002). In a speech announcing the creation of
this task force, President Bush stated, ―This broad effort is sending a clear warning and a clear message
to every dishonest corporate leader: You will be exposed and you will be punished . . . . We will deter
corporate crimes by enforcing tough penalties.‖ David Voreacos & Bob Van Voris, Bush Fraud
Probes Jail Corporate Criminals Less Than Two Years, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 13, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&refer=trac&sid=awztp90u5kEo. Of the 1,236
convictions from 2002 to 2007, only 1,133 defendants were sentenced; 47 percent of those got a year or
less in prison. Id.
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Exhibit 3
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C. Gall v. United States
Almost three years after Booker, the Court held in Gall that sentences
above or below the Guidelines‘ ranges are to be reviewed by courts of appeals under an abuse-of-discretion standard, not a reasonableness standard.40 The Court explained that while a district court judge must give
―serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines,‖
the Guidelines are in effect only advisory.41 The Court also rejected an
appellate rule that required ―extraordinary‖ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the guideline range because the Guidelines are merely a starting point—they are not the only consideration in sentencing.42 Moreover,
―[t]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a
different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the
district court.‖43 Thus, the Court‘s ruling effectively reduced the authority
of the Guidelines, enabling district court judges to impose the sentences
they deem appropriate, while limiting an appellate court‘s ability to overturn sentences to cases where the sentencing judge makes either a procedural error or abuses his discretion in determining the factors supporting
the sentence and any justified deviation from the Guidelines.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 594–96.
Id. at 597.
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In a federal system where 97 percent of criminal defendants plead
guilty,44 the clear winners of the Court‘s position in Gall appear to be criminal defendants. Although sentencing enhancements for white-collar
crimes are heavily based upon the amount of loss caused by defendants and
the number of victims harmed by their conduct, judges have continued to
sentence defendants involved in financial crimes that cause massive
amounts of financial damage to either probation or only a few months in
prison.45 Judges have repeatedly used these subjective enhancements as a
method to depart from the possible calculated sentences, thus ensuring
sentences more lenient than the Guideline range.46 As a result of this judicial conduct, defendants may be more willing to take their chances with a
sympathetic judge than to negotiate with prosecutors.47
III. EXAMINING THE DOWNWARD TREND: FINANCIAL CRIMES AND
SENTENCING
The post-Gall world creates enormous opportunities for district court
judges to have a major impact on sentencing jurisprudence in the United
States, and for white-collar defendants to persuade sentencing judges to
move downward from guideline ranges based on subjective factors.48
Factors such as the defendant‘s age, health, character, lack of prior
criminal record, family and community ties, and charitable activities were
expressly rejected by appellate courts prior to Gall.49 Now that these factors are fair game to justify sentences, it will be important to note whether
the newfound freedom bestowed on district court judges causes a return to
the non-uniform sentencing that led to the creation of Guidelines in the
first place, or instead creates a new type of uniform jurisprudence that establishes more standardized and recognized justifications for deviating
sentences.50 The following sections will test this hypothesis by examining
CFO sentencing during the past ten years.
44. Douglas F. Fries, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Weight-Loss Plan: Just How
Mandatory Are the “Advisory” Guidelines after United States v. Booker?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1097, 1112 (2005).
45. Alan Ellis & James H. Feldman, Jr., Representing White Collar Clients in a Post-Booker World,
CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 14.
46. See infra Part III.B. (showing Post-Booker cases applying subjective factors in giving downward-departure sentences to criminal defendants).
47. Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker,
53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1520 (2006).
48. See generally Tusk, supra note 9.
49. Id.
50. Id. One author opines:
Judicial discretion in sentencing and individualized justice—it sounds like the good old
days. Well, the good old days—at least for judges, defense attorneys and defendants—are
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A. Pre-Booker Sentencing
As discussed above, the mandatory character of the Guidelines prior to
Booker provided white-collar defendants with firm uniform sentences
based on the nature of their crimes, not on subjective factors established by
the court, and were reviewed for reasonableness if the sentence was outside
the guideline range. The following cases examine white-collar sentencing
under this mandatory Guidelines standard.
An example of the stiff sentences imposed on white-collar criminals
during the pre-Booker period is presented in United States v. Lloyd.51 William Lloyd, CFO of The Targus Group during the late 1990s, utilized his
company‘s credit facilities and cash flow for his own personal benefit and
covered up his activities by creating false and fraudulent entries on the
company‘s books, eventually embezzling over $40 million.52 Lloyd pled
guilty to fifteen counts of wire fraud, money laundering, and aiding and
abetting, and was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison, with a calculated Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months.53 The judge allowed Lloyd to plead guilty to a reduced number of counts, but, in exchange for this, the judge sentenced him to the maximum number of
months allowable within the guideline range.54
Another case demonstrating the stiff sentences imposed during this period is United States v. Atnip.55 In one of the largest insurance schemes in
the history of the United States, Gary Atnip served as the CFO of Franklin
American Corporation, one of the various insurance companies acquired
by financier Martin Frankel‘s business empire. During his tenure as the
CFO from 1991 to 1999, Atnip helped Frankel defraud insurance companies of over $200 million and transfer those assets into Frankel‘s private
bank accounts in Switzerland.56 In a deal with the government intended to
reduce his possible sentence, Atnip agreed to cooperate by pleading guilty
to one count of money laundering and conspiracy to violate the Racketeer

back again . . . [a]nd the shackles on federal trial judges in the form of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines have been loosened so much, they might just slip off entirely.
Robert G. Seidenstein, Sea Change in Sentencing: Power Returned to Fed Judges in the Trenches, 16
N.J. LAWYER: THE WEEKLY NEWSPAPER NO. 51 1 (2007).
51. United States v. Lloyd, No. 01-0155 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2002).
52. Id.
53. Id. The exact range was not available because the records are sealed, but this estimated range is
based on the 1998 Guidelines.
54. Lloyd was initially charged with twenty-five counts, but the government agreed to recommend a
reduced sentence in exchange for pleading guilty. Id.
55. No. 02-0369 (D. Conn. June 19, 2003).
56. A 10th Person Pleads Guilty in Big Scheme to Bilk Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06E6DA173CF930A15751C1A9649C8B63.
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Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).57 The court accepted the
government‘s motion for downward departure and a calculated sentencing
range of 121 to 151 months, sentencing Atnip to 121 months imprisonment.58
Although sentencing judges could impose a sentence outside the guideline range pre-Booker, the factors that judges could rely upon were strictly
limited,59 and appellate courts carefully scrutinized sentences outside the
Guidelines for reasonableness.60 A case demonstrating the reasonableness
standard is the high-profile criminal probe against HealthSouth‘s former
CFO, Michael Martin, who cooperated with the government against his
former boss, CEO Richard Scrushy, in exchange for a more lenient sentence.61 Martin pled guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud, mail
fraud, and falsifying books, resulting in a calculated guideline range of 108
to 135 months imprisonment.62 Although the government filed a section
5K1.1 motion for downward departure based on Martin‘s substantial assistance, and recommended a sentence of sixty-two months imprisonment,63
the court instead decided to sentence Martin to sixty months of probation.64
The Eleventh Circuit reversed Martin‘s sentence as unreasonable, stating
that ―Martin‘s cooperation, even viewed as extraordinary and commendable, cannot erase the enormity of Martin‘s underlying criminal conduct in
the billion-dollar fraud scheme he played a major role in perpetrating.‖65
As demonstrated in the pre-Booker Guidelines sentencing cases shown
in Exhibit 4 below, a judge‘s discretion in sentencing outside the guideline
range was strictly limited. Although this type of mandatory sentencing did
not give the courts the ability to deviate from the Guidelines sentences to
57. Atnip, No. 02-0369.
58. Id.
59. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(h), 5G1.1(c).
60. Bissonnette, supra note 47, at 1518.
61. United States v. Martin, 135 F. App‘x 411, 412 (11th Cir. 2005).
62. Id. at 412–13.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 414.
65. United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1241 (11th Cir. 2006). When the fraud committed by
HealthSouth‘s officers was made public, the stock plummeted from $3.91 per share to $0.11 per share.
Id. at 1230. The court noted that a conservative estimate of the stock value loss attributed to Martin‘s
fraud was approximately $1.4 billion. Id. at 1230–31. This was the second time that the Eleventh
Circuit had remanded Martin‘s sentence to the district court; therefore this time the circuit court directed the case to be reassigned to a different judge, because ―the original judge would have difficulty
putting his previous views and findings aside.‖ Id. at 1242. Of the seventeen officers charged with
crimes in the HealthSouth scandal, only four were sentenced to any imprisonment, the longest sentence
being 27 months served by former CFO Weston Smith. See Michael Tomberlin, HealthSouth Whistleblower Smith Gets OK to Start Prison Sentence During Appeal, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 25, 2005,
at A1. At Smith‘s sentencing, Judge Propst noted that others involved in the fraud had not received as
much prison time as Smith, which he attributed to other individuals being ―wrongfully acquitted or
sentenced too lightly.‖ Id.
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meet the individual factors of a defendant, it did provide greater uniformity
in white-collar sentencing.66 Thus, the Guidelines did, for the most part,
fulfill Congress‘s intent in establishing uniform sentencing by removing
subjective factors and a judge‘s personal views in the calculation of a
white-collar defendant‘s sentencing.
Exhibit 4
Name &
Position

Guideline
Range

BFG, Inc.

Patrick Bennett,
CFO

Franklin
American Corp.

Gary Atnip,
CFO

188 to 235
months
121 to 151
months (approx.
calculation of
offense level 32
in 1998 Guidelines)

Ferrofluidics
Corp.

Jan R. Kirk,
CFO

63 to 78 months

HealthSouth

Michael Martin,
Former CFO

108 to 135
months

Company

Targus Group

William Lloyd,
CFO

The Sirena
Apparel Group

Richard Gerhart,
CFO

37 to 46 months
(approx. calculation of offense
level 21 in 1998
Guidelines)
4 to 10 months
(approx. calculation of offense
level 9 in 1998
Guidelines)

Sentence

Trial
or
Plea

264 months
imprisonment

Trial

121 months
imprisonment

Plea

63 months
imprisonment
Originally 60 months
probation; resentenced to 7 days
imprisonment; sentence remanded as
―unreasonable‖ and
still pending

Plea

Plea

37 months
imprisonment

Plea

4 months
imprisonment

Plea

B. Post-Booker Sentencing
With the elimination of the mandatory nature of the Guidelines following Booker, judges became free to deviate from the sentencing ranges. The
subjective factors which were previously not allowed to be taken into con66. See Exhibit 4 infra.
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sideration in sentencing could now be used to calculate and justify ranges
outside the Guidelines. As shown in Exhibit 5,67 the pre-Guidelines sentencing disparities had been significantly reduced during the mandatory
Guidelines period, but following Booker they were executing an aboutface, resulting in increased numbers of downward-departure sentences for
white-collar offenders.
Exhibit 5
Rate of Imprisonment for White-Collar Offenses
70

61

% Imprisonment

60

53

51

50
39
40
30
20
10
0
1984 (PreGuidelines)

1990

1999

2006 (PostBooker)

One factor that has a significant impact in the calculation of the Guideline sentences for white-collar defendants is the amount of loss attributed
to a defendant‘s fraudulent actions.68 Courts have continued to struggle in
determining how to properly and effectively assess investor loss in fraud
cases, especially because of the numerous economic and highly technical
factors used to determine loss.69 Furthermore, since determining loss is an
imprecise and subjective exercise, courts are able to manipulate investor
loss numbers to either reduce or increase the sentence of a defendant.70

67. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 58.
68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2008).
69. See generally Lawrence J. Zweifach et al., Loss Causation and the Criminal Prosecution of
Securities Law Violations, 1505 PLI/CORP. 327 (2005) (discussing the difficulty of determining loss for
the purpose of sentencing white-collar criminals).
70. Id.
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The impact of the investor loss calculation in a defendant‘s Guideline
range is demonstrated in United States v. Olis.71 In that case, Jamie Olis‘s
original calculated sentence of 292 months in prison was based upon an
―actual loss‖ to investors of $105 million from his actions.72 However, the
court recalculated Olis‘s sentence based instead on an ―intended loss‖ of
$79 million, reducing the guideline range to 151 to 188 months.73 The
court relied on Booker to apply a downward-departure because it saw the
calculated range as ―unreasonable,‖ sentencing Olis to only seventy-two
months.74 Similarly, in United States v. Shanahan,75 Robert Gagalis, the
former CFO of Enterasys, was found guilty of securities fraud, wire fraud,
and conspiracy charges related to a revenue recognition scheme.76 Although the court accepted the method used by the government‘s expert
witness to calculate the loss to investors, the court reduced the total loss
amount from $144 million to only $97 million, a figure just below the $100
million threshold that would have almost doubled Gagalis‘s sentencing
range.77
Another factor having an enormous impact in the calculation of Guideline sentencing is whether a defendant cooperates with government prose71. 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005). Jamie Olis, the Senior Director of Tax Planning and International
at Dynegy, was convicted in 2005 for his participation in a scheme that led to accounting fraud. Id. at
541. Olis, along with two other co-workers, participated in ―Project Alpha,‖ a complicated scheme that
borrowed $300 million to make it appear as if money was generated through Dynegy‘s operations. Id.
Dynegy facilitated this scheme through the creation of a special purpose entity (SPE) owned by
Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse. Id. The SPE bought natural gas at market prices, and sold it to
Dynegy at a discount; Dynegy then sold the gas at the market price, allowing Dynegy to classify the
$300 million as operating cash flow and $79 million in net income, which was then reported as a tax
benefit. Id. at 541–42. Under SEC regulations, classification of this transaction as operating income,
as opposed to a financial transaction, required the SPE to be independent from Dynegy and the financer
to bear the risk of its investment. Id.
72. Id. at 542.
73. United States v. Olis, No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006).
74. Id. at *13. Even though Olis‘s sentence was less than half of the Guidelines minimum, it was
not overturned as an ―unreasonable‖ sentence by the appellate court. Id.
75. No. 04-0126, 2007 DNH 097 (D. N.H. Aug. 15, 2007).
76. Id. Unlike most other securities fraud cases, Enterasys‘s CEO, Enrique Fiallo, pled guilty to one
count of securities fraud and agreed to cooperate with federal prosecutors against the officers who
worked directly underneath him at Enterasys. Id. Based upon Fiallo‘s substantial assistance, the court
sentenced him on November 19, 2007 to four years imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
Id. Gagalis conspired with several other executive officers to conceal information about the ―threecorner‖ deals from its outside auditors in order to falsify revenue figures and meet Wall Street analysts‘
expectations. Id. The ―three-corner‖ deals generated revenue when Enterasys invested money in other
companies in exchange for equity or debt interests in those companies, but there was an understanding
that the ―investment‖ money would immediately be used to purchase Enterasys‘s products from thirdparty distributors, enabling Enterasys to conceal the link between the ―investment‖ money and the sales
transactions. Id. Enterasys and the companies involved in these ―three-corner‖ transactions generated
―side letters‖ agreeing to the terms of the deals, but the letters were kept secret and undisclosed from
auditors. Id. Thus, Enterasys was able to avoid the proper application of the revenue recognition
criteria.
77. Id.
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cutors or instead decides to try his chances in court. Although plea bargain
agreements are a very important tool wielded by government prosecutors,
judges have used prosecutors‘ section 5K1.1 motions for downward departures as a method to deviate even further downward from Guidelines,
sometimes significantly more than the prosecutors‘ recommended sentences.
In United States v. Sullivan,78 WorldCom‘s CFO, Scott Sullivan, pled
guilty to charges of conspiracy, securities fraud, and making false financial
filings, while agreeing to cooperate with the government against CEO Bernie Ebbers.79 The district court calculated Sullivan‘s guideline range of
262 to 327 months imprisonment, but based upon Sullivan‘s substantial
assistance in obtaining the conviction of Ebbers,80 the court imposed a
downward-departure sentence of only sixty months imprisonment.81
Again, a downward-departure sentence for substantial assistance was demonstrated in United States v. Fastow,82 where Enron‘s former CFO, Andrew Fastow, agreed to testify against his former employers in exchange for
a reduced sentence.83 Although the court calculated Fastow‘s guideline
range as 108 to 132 months, he was sentenced to only seventy-two months
imprisonment largely because of his ―substantial assistance.‖84
Although both investor loss and substantial assistance are some of the
most significant factors in determining a white-collar defendant‘s sentence,
they do not make up an exclusive list. As shown by the cases listed in Exhibit 6, below, CFOs have continually been sentenced below the Guidelines, a trend that has significantly increased post-Booker.

78. No. 02-1144 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2005). Sullivan was only one of the many charged in engineering the $11 billion accounting fraud at WorldCom, the country‘s second-largest phone carrier, which
eventually led to one of the largest bankruptcies in history.
79. Id. Since Sullivan had testified against Ebbers at the government‘s request, the prosecution filed
a section 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure based on Sullivan‘s substantial assistance in getting a
conviction on Ebbers. Id.
80. Id. Assistant U.S. Attorney David Anders, who led the prosecution stated to the court: ―Without
Mr. Sullivan‘s cooperation, it is likely that Ebbers would never have been brought to justice . . . I think
it‘s fair to describe his efforts as exceptional.‖ Jennifer Bayot & Roben Farzad, Ex-WorldCom Officer
Sentenced to 5 Years in Accounting Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at C1.
81. Sullivan, No. 02-1144. Interesting to note is the disparity between going to trial and cooperating
with prosecutors. While Sullivan got a sentence of five years in prison, Ebbers received twenty-five
years. As one former federal prosecutor notes, ―if you see the light and cooperate with the government,
the government will use that cooperation to mitigate any fines and penalties.‖ See Bayot & Farzad,
supra note 80.
82. No. 02-0665 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2006).
83. Fastow testified against both Enron‘s CEO, Jeffery Skilling, and Chairman, Kenneth Lay. Id.
84. Id. Skilling‘s Guideline range was 292 to 365 months, and he received a sentence on the low
end of the scale (292 months). United States v. Causey, No. 04-0025-2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2006).
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Exhibit 6
Post-Booker Sentencing
Company

Dynegy

Enterasys
Adelphia
Leslie Fay Co.

Name &
Position
Jamie Olis,
Sr. Dir. Tax
Planning &
International
Robert
Gagalis, CFO
Timothy Rigas, CFO
Paul
Polishan, CFO

Guideline Range

151 to 188 months

135 to 168 months
Max. sentence 215
years
108 to 135 months

Sentence
72 months
imprisonment
138 months
imprisonment
240 months
imprisonment
108 months
imprisonment

Trial
or
Plea
Trial

Trial
Trial
Trial

Smith
Technologies

Richard Boyer,
CFO

87 to 108 months
(approx calculation of
offense level 29 in
1998 Guidelines)

12 months
imprisonment

Trial

Impath, Inc.

David J.
Cammarata,
CFO

51 to 63 months (approx calculation of
offense level 24 in
2001 Guidelines)

1 month imprisonment

Plea

WorldCom

Scott
Sullivan, CFO

262 to 327 months

60 months
imprisonment

Plea

HealthSouth

Weston L.
Smith,
Former CFO

Max. sentence 300
months - 5K1.1 motion recommendation
of 60 months

27 months
imprisonment

Plea

HealthSouth
Enron
CUC
International /
Cendant
Qwest Communications

William T.
Owens, CFO
Andrew
Fastow, CFO
Cosmo
Corigliano,
CFO
Grant Graham,
CFO

Max. sentence 360
months
108 to 132 months

60 months
imprisonment
72 months
imprisonment

Plea
Plea

78 to 97 months

36 months
probation

Plea

8 to 14 months

Time already
served

Plea
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IV. CONCLUSION
Yes, as through this world I‘ve wandered
I‘ve seen lots of funny men;
Some will rob you with a six-gun
And some with a fountain pen.85
As obvious today as it was at the time the great folk singer Woody
Guthrie wrote the words above, society has differentiated between crimes
of violence and white-collar crimes. Although both acts result in harm to
victims, the victims of white-collar crimes are more difficult to directly
identify and associate with the crime, and judges have historically been
more lenient on those criminals as opposed to criminals who commit violent crimes. This was the disparity Congress attempted to correct by instituting sentencing guidelines in the first place, by providing sentences
which corresponded to the impact of an offender‘s crime.
However, Gall drastically reduced the authority of the Guidelines, possibly eliminating its power entirely. Even after the Court‘s decision in
Booker, the Guidelines still played a major role in the sentencing of criminal defendants by requiring district courts to calculate the guideline ranges,
even where the court is not required to give a guideline sentence when
there is a compelling reason under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 to depart from the
calculated range. But, since the departure sentences were subject to review
for reasonableness, circuit courts had the ability to remand sentences that
were unreasonable in comparison to the guideline range. The Gall decision eliminated an appellate court‘s ability to reject unreasonable departure
sentences by restricting their review to the abuse of discretion standard.
Thus, the Court effectively told district court judges that they can ignore
the Guidelines and sentence defendants as they see fit, as long as they give
―lip service‖ to the Guidelines.86
If the post-Booker trend in white-collar sentencing continues, judges
will continue to impose downward-departure sentences. Although there
are a few exceptions to this trend—as seen in the recent wave of highprofile white-collar cases where defendants were given significant sentences87—these exceptions are few and judges continue to deliver below-

85. WOODY GUTHRIE, Pretty Boy Floyd, on STRUGGLE (Asch Records 1944) (quoted by Ford,
supra note 11, at 396), available at http://www.woodyguthrie.org/Lyrics/Pretty_Boy_Floyd.htm.
86. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 604 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).
87. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (sentencing WorldCom CEO
Bernie Ebbers to twenty-five years imprisonment); United States v. Forbes, No. 02-0264 (D. Conn. Jan.
23, 2007) (sentencing CUC International/Cendant‘s Chairman Walter Forbes to 151 months imprisonment with a Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months); United States v. Causey, No. 04-0025-2 (S.D.
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guideline sentences to white-collar defendants. Many courts and commentators continue to believe that even the advisory Guideline sentences for
white-collar criminals are particularly excessive and inconsistent with section 3553(a)‘s instruction that sentences be ―sufficient, but not greater than
necessary‖ to achieve statutory sentencing goals.88 For example, Judge
Rakoff noted the ―travesty of justice that sometimes results from the guidelines‘ fetish with abstract arithmetic, as well as the harm that guideline
calculations can visit on human beings if not cabined by common sense.‖89
While some legal experts argue that the recent lengthy sentences
handed out to white-collar defendants might appear harsh,90 the Sentencing
Commission‘s study of ―15 Years of Guidelines Sentencing‖ noted that the
white-collar Guidelines were written to ―ensure a short but definite period
of confinement for a larger percentage of these ‗white collar‘ cases, both to
ensure proportionate punishment and to achieve adequate deterrence.‖91
Many of the subjective factors that may now be considered at sentencing—
such as the defendant‘s old age,92 family ties and responsibilities,93 or a
history of community service94—are likely to have special relevance during the sentencing phase. These factors give particular advantage to whitecollar defendants, who typically have the resources to make extensive sentencing presentations and arguments. Moreover, unlike defendants who
have dealt drugs or committed crimes of violence, white-collar criminals
are more likely to have engaged in charitable good works or to have maintained significant ties to their local community. Thus, white-collar crimi-

Tex. Oct. 25, 2006) (sentencing Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling to 292 months imprisonment with a
Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months).
88. See Simon Romero, Revision of 24-Year Prison Term Ordered in Accounting Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at C3 (stating Olis became a poster child for excessive punishment for whitecollar crime); Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Long to Jail White-Collar Criminals?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2005, at C1 (arguing long sentences handed down for corporate officers were excessive); Neil Weinberg & Mary Ellen Egan, Criminal Injustice System, FORBES, Apr. 26, 2004, at 42 (arguing against
harsh sentences for corporate officers).
89. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (imposing forty-two month
sentence when the Guidelines range was eighty-five years to life, where the court concluded that ―the
evidence showed that Adelson was sucked into the fraud not because he sought to inflate the company‘s earnings, but because, as President of the company, he feared the effects of exposing what he had
belatedly learned was the substantial fraud perpetrated by others‖).
90. See supra note 87.
91. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 1, at vii.
92. Even prior to Gall, some district court judges had already given downward departures based on
the fact that individuals are less likely to commit crimes as they get older. See, e.g., Simon v. United
States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that the recidivism rate drops dramatically for
defendants with significant criminal histories but who are over forty years old).
93. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2004).
94. See United States v. Coughlin, No. 06-20005, 2008 WL 313099, at *4–5 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 1,
2008) (justifying the defendant‘s sentence based upon factors such as the defendant‘s age, health, and
charitable contributions, and longstanding history of community service).
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nals are more likely to benefit from these factors than other types of criminals.
Although the Guidelines were specifically drafted to increase the likelihood of imprisonment and the length of sentences in white-collar cases,
the Gall decision should generally weaken the power and leverage of the
Guidelines, resulting in shorter sentences for white-collar criminal defendants. But, will we see the disparity in sentencing of white-collar criminals
return to the same levels that existed prior to the Guidelines? If the postBooker trend continues as demonstrated in the exhibits above, it is apparent
that the disparity will increase and judges will continue to impose downward-departure sentences upon white-collar defendants, but more specifically upon CFOs.

